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ARGUMENT
I.

RULE 65B(i) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, ALLOW FOR THE
PROPER RAISING OF ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL
Rule 65B(i)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide an

additional opportunity for a criminal defendant
commitment.

The rule

writ of habeas corpus.
of similar
65B(f).

of 65B(f) which governs a

The rule does

issues under

To the

under this

is independent

65B(i) as

not prohibit
may have

contrary, 65B(i)(2)

to challenge his

the bringing

been brought under

indicates that

a Complaint

rule is not barred because similar proceedings in any

court, state of federal, have been instituted by the complainant,
but merely

requires that

Thereafter, if the Court
Court,

through

legality of the
proceedings, the

Judge

the complaint set forth such pleading.
determines, as

Rokich,

confinement

that

has

complaint shall

been

did the

the

constitutionality

adjudged

be dismissed.

of 65B(i) then provides for appellate review.
1

Third District

in

or

such prior

Subsection (10)

Clearly

Appellate*s

request

that

this

Court

review the

revocation of his probation is not barred by the doctrine
judicata.

To

the

contrary,

because

of res

Judge Rokich used Judge

Daniel decision as his basis for dismissing the Complaint brought
pursuant to

Rule 65B(i)

Daniels are preserved
issues

been

the

the same

for

basis

issues as

litigated by Judge

appeal.

Had

of

Rokich's

Judge

Respondent's argument of timeliness

some

other different
dismissal,

of appeal

then

would have merit.

As it stands, it does not.
In Andrews

v. Morris,

677 P.2d

Court of Utah stated that Rule
order that

81 (Utah 1983) the Supreme

65B(i) qualified

a review

of an

was claimed to have substantially denied rights under

the United States Constitution of the Utah Constitution, or both,
not

withstanding

65B(i)
review,

provided
when,

prior
a

as

proceedings.

second
here,

round

The Court indicated that

of

petitions

for collateral

the issues of denial of constitutional

rights are raised.
Respondent cites Rule 65B(10)
that it

required Appellant

Habeas Corpus

to

the

Utah R.

to bring

Court

for

Civ. P.,

the denial

review.

and argues

of his Writ of

Respondent quotes,

however, Rule 65B(i)(10), which Appellant argues give rise to his
right to bring
review.

the

dismissal

of

his

complaint

for appellate

Rule 65B(f), Utah R. Civ. P., does not have a subsection

(10) and its presence at the

end of

subsection (i) specifically

permits this appeal on all the issues raised herein.
Since Judge

Rokich relied

on Judge
2

Daniel's reasoning for

dismissing

the

Appellant's

perceived he was bound
that reasoning

by Judge

his

this

and

Judge

Rokich

ruling, it is

Appellant should be allowed to

appeal,

extraordinary

because

Daniel's earlier

that is at issue.

attack the reasoning in
dismiss

case,

writ.

where

same

While

not

was

used to

intending

to

"circumvent the direct appellate process," Rule 65B(i) appears to
specifically

provide

a

second

opportunity to the Appellant to

redress his claimed substantial denial of constitutional rights.
Respondent's
understood by

"curiosity"

Respondent why

that the doctrine of
itself,

self

res

there is

judicata

deceiving.

the first

time it

judicata.

extraordinary
Judge Rokich;s

that

it

isn't

no argument by Appellant

was

improperly

that because

applied, is

the District Court

denied Appellant's

Corpus, that it didn't make it
Appellant's

in

Respondent appears to hope the Court

will choose to ignore the issue
was wrong

argument,

right the

writ,

using

statement that

Writ of Habeas

second time
the

it denied

doctrine

of

res

he was

barred by said

doctrine does not make the earlier ruling proper.

Judge Rokich's

ruling is equally erroneous as Judge Daniel's because
res judicata

to dismiss

the action.

he invoked

Because he relied on Judge

Daniel's ruling to reject Appellant's Writ, Judge Rokich invites,
and nearly certifies for review, the same challenge to his ruling
as would have been brought against Judge Daniel's ruling.
In fact, as is graciously pointed out by
the doctrine

the Respondent, if

of res judicata is properly applied where it should

be applied, it would

have prevented
3

Judge Daniel's

changing of

his mind
this

regarding the

doctrine

proceeding,

does

Defendant's probation.

not

Respondent

apply
seems

afforded to a person, by law

to

to

the

By arguing that

probation

violation

be saying that the protection

and equity,

do not

apply when the

need them the most.

The protection are only there for the state,

not the individual.

The individual can be

more than

subjected to jeopardy

once, but the state shouldn't have to face a challenge

to its actions more than once if it doesn't feel like it.
Appellant has properly brought
issue of

the lack of notice.

the

additional

Rule 65B(i) does not carry with it

a time frame for bringing the challenge.
appeal in

this matter

first appellate
sense.

allows the

review.

due process

That there was no prior

bringing of the issue in this

Additionally, the argument makes perfect

Because he was not afforded proper notice, Appellant was

unable to properly prepare his
that time.

objections

to

the

affidavit at

By learning of the second hearing on an Order to Show

Cause only moments before it took place, Appellant was denied the
opportunity

to

properly

prepare

his

argues that because he didn't raise

defense.

the lack

of notice argument

then, he shouldn't be allowed to raise it now.
more nonsensically
states that

than any

defendant's

saying

in

Additionally, and

Appellant's, Respondent

notwithstanding the lack of notice, Appellant should

have been prepared anyway.
a

argument of

Respondent now

inability

essence

initially, he

that

shouldn't be

Respondent attempts to
to

properly

since

the

capitalize on

prepare

for he a ring, by

defendant

wasn't prepared

able to bring a claim that he didn't

4

have proper notice, even though the improper notice was the cause
of the non-preparation.
Respondent additionally seeks to
his counsel

at the

time of

penalize Appellant because

the second

Show Cause failed to object to

hearing on the Order to

said hearing

on his

behalf.

It

should come as no surprise to Respondent that the Appellant would
merely follow his counsel's
Appellant

has

no

clue

recommendation, particularly

as

to

what

is happening to him.

counsel told him to admit the allegations, and that by
it would not affect his time incarcerated.
turned out to be very erroneous.
his Appeal
object to

if the
His

doing so,

The advice of counsel

Appellant should not

be denied

merely because he possessed insufficient knowledge to
what

was

happening,

especially

after

receiving no

notice of the second hearing.

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS SHOULD APPLY WHENEVER A
DEFENDANT IS IN JEOPARDY OF LOSING LIBERTY,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE TYPE OF HEARING OR HEARING BODY,
AND THEREFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
MUST APPLY TO PROBATION REVOCATION HEARINGS
The Constitution

of the

Utah contain no provisions
being

controlled

by

United States

excepting any
its

and of the State of

person or

protection.

entity from

Clearly,

certain

constitutional rights may be suspended, however, those provisions
which

provide

double jeopardy

for

due

should

process
never

be

of law, and protection against
exorcised

from

any entity's

responsibility whenever said entity can deprive another person of
other constitutional rights.

By allowing any entity to disregard
5

constitutional

provisions

and

protection,

as

it

considers

revoking or denying other constitutional rights of any individual
invites absolute
losing

corruption.

certain

protection,
twice in

When a

constitutional

including

jeopardy

the

person is

rights,

all

in jeopardy of
constitutional

prohibition against placing a person

for

the

same

offense,

should

pay

more

attention

should

be strictly

enforced .
Respondent

1978) than

Said dissent provides a much more plausible
majority.

S.W.2d

excellent

vs.

and fair argument than the

574

the

dissent in Davenport
it has.

State.

to

Said

73 (Tex.Crim.App.

dissenting opinion

states in pertinent part:
Yet the anxiety, insecurity, strain and potential
M
of imprisonment are real
risks n
faced
by the
probationer brought before the court on a motion to
revoke probation filed by the State. The stigma from a
revocation of probation is real, especially when the
revokee is subsequently considered for parole.... 574
S.W.2d, at 78.
...the
doctrine
of
double
jeopardy should
certainly attach to any subsequent efforts to revoke
the probationer's conditions on the same offense. 574
S.W.2d at 79.
As stated by the Supreme Court in Burks v. U.S.
437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1, (1978), "the
purposes of the Clause (double jeopardy) would be
negated were we to afford the Government an opportunity
for the proverbial 'second bite at the apple.f!f437 U.S.
at 17, 98 S.Ct. at 2150. 574 S.W.2d at 79.
The Utah

Supreme Court

preliminary

hearings.

hearing and

the preliminary hearing are similar, as is argued by

the Respondent,

then

If

has placed a jeopardy protection on

the

in

fact

Supreme

the

Court's

probation revocation

ruling

in

State v

Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) ought to apply in the probation
6

revocation hearing also.

In Brickev , the Court stated,

We find
merit
in the approach
taken
by the
Oklahoma courts.
In Jones
v. State. 481 P.2d 169
(Okla.Crim.App.1971), the
Oklahoma
Court of Criminal
Appeals held that due process considerations prohibit a
prosecutor
from
refiling
criminal
charges
earlier
dismissed
for
insufficient
evidence
unless the
prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable
evidence
has surfaced
or
that
other
good
cause
justifies refiling. 481 P.2d at 171.... Imposing this
requirement on prosecutors
places a relatively small
burden on them, yet adequately protects the due process
interests of an accused.
We
therefore
adopt this
approach for Utah.
If, as

the Respondent argues, a probation revocation hearing and

a preliminary hearing
apply the

are

so

to either

it, then based on

Brickey, we agree.

In any event, whether in a

probation hearing

or

hearing,

preliminary

jeopardy or

sufficiently
not apply

a

doctrine of

similar,

unless

there is good cause, or new

evidence is available, there should be

no refiling

of either an

information, or an Order to Show Cause.
Respondent

attempts

to

say

impossible to have a defendant on
the

same

time.

This

that

it

would

probation and

be absurd or

incarcerated at

is neither impossible nor absurd.

Many

times, as a condition of probation, a probationer will be ordered
to serve
likely

time incarcerated.
to

comply

Additionally,

it

with
is

not

Additionally, a probationer is very

his

probation

inconceivable

while
that

an

incarcerated.
incarcerated

prisoner has sufficient autonomy to either cooperate or refuse to
comply with

probation officials

while in prison.

Nevertheless,

the record of Appellant would show him to be a model prisoner who
would very

likely comply

in all respects with probation, had it

7

been continued the second time.
CONCLUSION
Respondent
convicted of
ought to

states

simply

robbery while

be committed

that

fairness dictates that one

on probation

to prison.

for aggravated robbery

This attitude is fairly clear

from the states refiling the same affidavit for an Order
Cause

to

revoke

Appellants

probation when they did not obtain

their desired results the first time.
fairness dictates
apple.

that the

to Show

As

stated above, however,

state not get the second bite at the

Judge Wilkensen apparently disagreed

with the

state, at

least the first time, when he deemed insufficient cause to revoke
Appellant's probation.
jeopardy protection

Fairness, and Appellant's due process and

rights require that the second apple bite be

taken away, and the probation for

the aggravated

robbery charge

continued.
DATED this

day of September, 1989.

Mark H. Tanner
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I sent to Kent M. Barry, Assistant Attorney General, 6100 South
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correct copies of the
above and
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depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage fully prepaid.
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